Cut alert volume
Cut the queue down to the alerts that matter.
Your detections aren't the problem. The volume they produce is. Classification, grouping, and enrichment turn a thousand alerts into a queue an analyst can actually finish.
The situation
What this usually looks like
If more than two of these are true, the work below is the work you are already doing by hand.
Analysts start the shift behind and end it further behind.
Throughput is capped by reading speed rather than by judgement.
The same event arrives as a dozen separate alerts from four tools.
Twelve reads, one decision, and eleven of them thrown away.
Nobody trusts the queue order, so everyone works from the top.
Severity collapses into arrival order and the ranking stops meaning anything.
Real incidents are found late, not because they were invisible but because they were buried.
Detection time gets measured from when somebody reached it, not from when it fired.
The mechanism
See, decide, act, and then wait.
Four movements, in order. The fourth is the one that matters: nothing destructive happens without a person releasing it.
- 1
See
Every alert in one shape
Alerts are read from S3 as Cribl Parquet, staged in a Redis queue, and normalised before anyone opens them. Whatever produced them, they arrive looking the same.
Amazon S3
Cribl Parquet
Redis queue
- Any SIEM
- 2
Decide
Classified, with the reasoning attached
An Isolation Forest model calls each alert a true or false positive and scores its confidence from 0 to 100. The features that drove the call are listed, and the alert is tagged with its MITRE ATT&CK technique and attack stage.
- Isolation Forest
- Confidence 0-100
MITRE ATT&CK
- Feature breakdown
- 3
Act
A queue you can actually finish
Confirmed threats open or update a Jira ticket. False positives are documented and closed with the determination attached. What reaches an analyst arrives with every address, domain, hash and account already enriched.
Jira
- Create and close
- Enriched on arrival
- 4
Gate
The classification stays yours to make
Changing a classification opens a three-step gate: a reason, then the ticket action, then the confirmation. Every confirmation and override is captured as reinforcement signal, and the console tracks agreement, disagreement, and whether enough has accrued to retrain.
- Reason mandatory
- Analyst feedback loop
- Drift watch
The mechanism
See, decide, act, and then wait.
See
Every alert in one shape
Alerts are read from S3 as Cribl Parquet, staged in a Redis queue, and normalised before anyone opens them. Whatever produced them, they arrive looking the same.
Decide
Classified, with the reasoning attached
An Isolation Forest model calls each alert a true or false positive and scores its confidence from 0 to 100. The features that drove the call are listed, and the alert is tagged with its MITRE ATT&CK technique and attack stage.
Act
A queue you can actually finish
Confirmed threats open or update a Jira ticket. False positives are documented and closed with the determination attached. What reaches an analyst arrives with every address, domain, hash and account already enriched.
Gate
The classification stays yours to make
Changing a classification opens a three-step gate: a reason, then the ticket action, then the confirmation. Every confirmation and override is captured as reinforcement signal, and the console tracks agreement, disagreement, and whether enough has accrued to retrain.
Four shapes in, one shape out. Normalised before anyone opens it.
The gate
Where the volume goes
Every agent on the platform resolves to one of three outcomes. Alert Navigator's gate is the classification itself: nothing reaches a ticket without a person naming why.
Runs on its own
Auto-execute
High-confidence, well-understood classifications are actioned and documented without waiting for anyone.
The ruleA failure is flagged for retry, not silently dropped.
Waits for a person
Analyst gate
Changing a classification opens a guided three-step gate before anything reaches Jira.
The ruleA reason is mandatory. There is no way past it.
Logged only
Monitor
Low-risk signals are logged and watched without action.
The ruleReady to escalate if the behaviour changes.
Confidence colours the queue before you open anything: 70 and above reads green, 50 to 69 amber, below 50 red.
Who does the work
One agent owns this end to end.
You can turn one on and add the others later. A connector configured for one is available to the rest.
Detect and Respond
Alert Navigator
Reads every alert your SIEM raises, classifies it, groups what belongs together, and hands your analysts a queue worth working.
Also named in this outcome
Action Feedback
Closes the loop on security actions, capturing outcomes and feeding them back to tune detection and training.
Questions
The things people ask first.
Does it close alerts on its own?
It closes what it's confident about and documents the determination on a Jira ticket, so a closure is a record, not a disappearance. Changing a classification always goes through the gate, where a reason is mandatory before the ticket action runs.
Can I see why it decided something?
Every alert exposes the features that drove its classification, the confidence behind it, and the MITRE tactic it mapped to. The classification is checkable rather than asserted, which is what makes agreeing or overriding a one-click decision.
What happens to my overrides?
They are reinforcement signal. The platform tracks decisions processed, model-analyst agreement, disagreement count, and whether enough disagreements have accrued to trigger a retrain, with a table of exactly where the model and your analysts diverged.
Which SIEM does it need?
Any. Alerts are read from S3 as Cribl Parquet and normalised on the way in, so the source tool is a detail, not a dependency. Okta, AWS CloudTrail and the usual threat-intel feeds attach as enrichment.
How would we know it's working?
Noise reduction is the headline measure, alongside mean time to triage and mean time to resolve. Model health carries accuracy, precision, recall and F1 with trend indicators, plus the training sources behind them.
The other outcomes
- Contain email compromiseScope and remove a malicious message on approval.
- Stop account takeoverCatch takeover signals, then contain the account.
- Govern AI usageDiscover AI tools, inspect what leaves, enforce policy.
- Clear the vulnerability backlogRank on exploit signal and drive fixes to closure.
- Get audit-readyScore frameworks, close gaps, collect evidence continuously.
